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Cert to CA 8 (Heaney, 
Stephenson & Oliver [DJ]) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the Nebraska legislature's 
practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a paid 
chaplain. ____....... 
2. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The rules of the Nebraska 
legislature provide that a chaplain shall be s by the 
n, s ~~ "-)oT -,-o ~e.. \h Ev...> 




legislature to open each day's session with a prayer. The 
chaplain is to be compensated out of state funds. For the past 
sixteen years, the legislature has employed a single chaplain to 
give the daily prayers. The daily prayers have from time to time 
been published in books and distributed at state expense. 
Resp, a member of the Nebraska legislature, brought this 
§1983 action claiming that the above practices violate the 
Establishment Clause of the 1st Arndt. Petrs, the legislative 
chaplain, state treasurer, and members of the legislature's 
Executive Board, moved to dismiss on the grounds of lOth Arndt 
immunity, common-law legislative immunity, and general principles 
of federalism. The DC (Urbom, CJ) denied the motion. On the 
merits, the DC held that the Establishment Clause was not 
violated by the practice of having daily prayers, but was 
violated by the compensation of the chaplain and the publication 
of the prayers at state expense. 
Petrs appealed from the DC's rulings on immunity and 
compensation of the chaplain. They did not appeal the portion of 
the ruling prohibiting publication of the prayers. Resp cross-
appealed from the DC' s ruling permitting the daily prayers to 
continue. 
The CA 8 agreed that resp' s action was not barred by the 
lOth Arndt, by general federalism principles, or by legislative 
immunity. Nothing in National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 
u.s. 833 (1976), suggests that the lOth Arndt immunizes states 
from challenges based on the Bill of Rights. Since there are no 
pending state proceedings regarding the prayer practices, general 
- 3 -
principles of federalism do not bar intervention by the federal 
courts. State legislators are immune from §1983 suits to the 
extent that members of Congress are immune under the Speech and 
Debate Clause, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 
u.s. 719 (1980), but the Speech and Debate Clause protects only 
"legislative acts." The prayers bear no relation to the process 
of enacting legislation, and judicial intervention would have no 
impact on the deliberative process of the legislature. 
On the merits, the CA 8 followed its prior decision in 
Bogen v. Doty, 598 F. 2d 1110 (1979) , which held that not every 
legislative prayer policy violates the Establishment Clause. 
Here, however, the CA 8 found that Nebraska's prayer policy 
failed to satisfy the three-part test set forth in Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756 (1973). The daily 
prayers, publishing of the prayer books, and appointment and 
compensation of the same chaplain for sixteen years, all formed 
part of a single policy which must be viewed as a whole. As a 
whole, it serves no secular purpose, has a primary effect of 
advancing one religious view, and entangles the state with 
religion. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs renew the three immunity arguments 
they made before the DC and CA. They contend that the lOth Arndt 
should bar this suit, because the relief resp claims would 
interfere with the Nebraska legislature's power to structure its 
own internal affairs. Fundamental principles of federalism also 
require judicial restraint in suits dealing with a state 
legislature's internal affairs. Moreover, all of the acts of 
- 4 -
which resp complains are "legislative acts" protected by common-
law immunity. 
On the merits, petrs contend that the CA 8' s decision 
directly conflicts with Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 392 
N.E.2d 1195 (Mass. 1979). Colo upheld a statute authorizing a 
long-term, paid chaplain to open each day's legislative session 
with a prayer. Although Colo did not involve the publication of 
prayer books, that issue was not properly before the CA 8 in this 
case because petrs had not appealed the DC's ruling. Petrs 
discuss the importance of the issues raised, and refer this Court 
to a pending challenge to Congress' practice of employing a 
chaplain. See Murray v. Morton, 505 F.Supp. 144 (DOC 1981), 
rev'd sub nom. Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14, petn for 
rehearing en bane granted, __ F.2d __ ( CA DC 19 8 2 ) • l 
Petrs also contend that the CA 8's decision was incorrect 
under the Nyquist test. In several prior decisions, members of 
this Court have suggested that employment of a legislative 
chaplain would not violate the Establishment Clause. E.g.' 
School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203, 213 (1963): 
id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring): Engel v. Vitale, 370 
u.s. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting): zorach v. 
Clause.!!_, 343 u.s. 306, 312 (1952): Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 u.s. 203, 253-54 (1948) (Reed, J., 
1The CA DC is scheduled to hear oral argument en bane in Murray 
on October 27, 1982. The DOC and theCA DC three-judge panel 
have addressed only issues of standing and justiciability, and 
not the merits of the Establishment Clause claim. 
- 5 -
dissenting). 
On the immunity issues, resp contends that the lOth Arndt 
has no application to suits involving the Bill of Rights, since 
the Bill of Rights places explicit limits on the states' powers. 
Neither general principles of federalism nor common-law immunity 
bars this suit, for the reasons given by the CA. 
On the merits, resp contends that the CA' s holding was a 
narrow one, applicable only to the facts before it. The CA did 
not rule on the constitutionality of legislative prayers 
generally, or even paid legislative chaplains generally. Petrs' 
arguments address broad issues which are simply not raised by 
this case. Colo can be distinguished on the ground that the 
state there had not printed any prayers at public expense. Even 
if Colo creates a conflict, it has not been followed by other 
courts. Finally, the CA 8 was correct in deciding that 
Nebraska's policy violates the Establishment Clause. 
4. DISCUSSION 
(a) Immunity: Petrs' lOth Arndt argument goes far 
beyond usury and subsequent lOth Arndt cases, which dealt only 
with limitations on Congress' Commerce Clause power. In City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156, 179-80 (1980), this Court 
held that the lOth Arndt placed no limits Congress' powers to 
enforce the 14th and 15th Amdts. Resp seems clearly right in 
arguing that the 1st Arndt, which explicitly limits state powers, 
cannot itself be limited by the lOth Arndt. 
Petrs' general federalism argument lacks merit. Petrs do 
.._____:- not explain how general federalism principles are affected by the 
- 6 -
federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction in this case, nor do 
they cite any case even suggesting that federalism principles 
preclude jurisdiction. 
State legislators are immune from suit under §1983 in 
situations where the Speech and Debate Clause would immunize 
members of Congress. Consumers Union, 446 u.s. at 732-33; Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951). This immunity extends to acts 
performed in the process of enacting legislation, or acts which 
form part of the deliberative and communicative processes of the 
legislature. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) ; 
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.s. 501 (1972). The CA' s 
conclusion that the hiring of a chaplain to give daily prayers is 
not such an act seems entirely correct. It does not conflict 
with decisions of any other courts. 
(b) Establishment Clause: The CA 8' s decision does 
conflict with that of the Mass. S.J.C. in Colo. The issue seems 
important enough to merit review by this Court, since all fifty 
states as well as Congress apparently provide for some sort of 
legislative prayer. However, resp is correct in pointing out 
that the CA 8 reached its decision on the narrowest possible 
grounds. In effect, the CA 8 said that the specific Nebraska 
policy before it was unconstitutional, but a different result 
might be reached under any other combination of circumstances. 
The issues addressed by petrs would more properly be resolved in 
a case that purports to announce a general rule. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: The CA's rulings on petrs' claims of 
irnrnuni ty appear to have been correct, and raise no conflict. 
- 7 -
Although the Establishment Clause issues are important and there 
does appear to be a conflict, the CA' s ruling may have been 
limited to its own facts. I therefore recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
August 6, 1982 Streisinger Opns in petn 
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May the Nebraska Legislature, consistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause, retain and compensate a single Presbyterian min-
ister as its chaplain for sixteen years? 
Outline of Memorandum page 
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I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Under Rule 1, §2, of the Rules of the Nebraska Unicamer-
al, the Legislature shall advise and consent to its Executive 
Board's recommendation on the appointment of a chaplain, who is 
designated as one of the Legislature's officers. His duties are 
defined as follows: 
The Chaplain shall attend and shall open with prayer 
each day's sitting of the Legislature. 
Nebraska Unicameral Rule 1, §21. Rule 7(A), §l(b) also provides 
that the "order of business of the Legislature" shall begin with 
a "Prayer by the Chaplain." 
B. Facts 
Petr Palmer is a Presbyterian minister in Lincoln, Ne-
braska. In 1965, he was selected as the chaplain of the Nebraska 
Legislature. He has served in that capacity ever since, having 
been re-elected to the position at the beginning of each 
session. 1 The State (through petr Marsh, the State Treasurer) 
compensates Palmer at the rate of $320.00 per month. 
Resp Chambers has been a member of the Nebraska Legisla-
ture since 1970. He is not a Christian, and he objects to the 
prayers that Palmer delivers at the opening of each sitting. 
1only the 1979 election, between Palmer and a Lutheran cler-
gyman, was contested. 
When he wishes to avoid being subjected to these prayers, he must 
leave the legislative chamber when they are being delivered. He 
claims that this interferes with his legislative duties, since 
much legislative business is conducted immediately before the 
sitting begins. 
The parties have included samples of Palmer's prayers in 
the Joint Appendix at pp. 92-108. The earlier ones are nondenom-
inational in the narrow sense. Although they are unmistakably 
Christian (with a definite Protestant tone), they are not identi-___ ....., 
fiably Presbyterian. The later ones seem nondenominational in a 
slightly broader sense. Explicit Christian references are less 
common (even though the tone remains distinctly Christian), and 
Judaism is recognized. Nevertheless, the prayers remain clearly 
witn1n the Judec-Christian framework. They are implicitly incon-
sistent with the religious beliefs of Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, 
etc., and explicitly inconsistent with the principles of atheism 
and agnosticism. 2 
c. Decisions Below 
Chambers challenged the legislative prayer practices in 
DC (D.Neb.: Urbom). The DC concluded that the practice of hold-
ing prayers at the beginning of each day did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. It reasoned that "what a legislature does 
2rn 1975, 1978, and 1979, several hundred copies of the pray-
ers were printed and distributed at state expense. The State no 
longer defends the constitutionality of that practice, so it ap-
pears that it is not an issue before this Court. 
for and by itself with no significant impact on anyone else" is 
not law-making within the scope of the Establishment Clause. The 
fact that there had been a single chaplain of a single faith for 
sixteen years did not alter this conclusion. The DC held that 
the publication of the prayers and the paying of the chaplain, 
however, did violate the Establishment Clause. Here the legisla-
ture was expending public funds on a religious purpose--the very 
activity that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent. 
The State did not appeal the DC's ruling prohibiting the 
publication of the prayers. It did appeal the compensation ---- --, 
issue. Chambers cross-appealed that portion of the judgment that 
permitted Palmer to continue as the chaplain. CAB (Heanev, Ste-
phenson, Oliver [Sr DJ; WD Mo]) affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. It declared that not every legislative prayer practice 
violates the Establishment Clause. But on the facts of this 
case, Nebraska had gone too far in retaining and compensating a 
single Presbyterian minister as its chaplain for sixteen years. 
This practice, viewed as a whole, failed to satisfy the three---part test of your opinion in Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 773 (1973) (citing 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612-613 (1971)). It serves no 
secular purpose, has a primary effect of advancing one religious 
view, and entangles the State with religion. 
II. Discussion ~ 
A. General Observations and Disclaimer ~ ~ ~ 
I must confess that I have som~:ouble seeing why the 
parties are so excited about this case. Even if Chambers is a 
non-Christian, Palmer's pravers do not seem so offensive that it 
is worth the effort of bringing a lawsuit to the Supreme Court. 
This is not a case in which impressionable young children are 
being forced against their will to attend proselytizing prayer 
sessions as part of their public school classes. Cf. Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962); Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 
U.S. (1983) (POWELL, J., in chambers). I assume that the 
Nebraska senators are all mature adults who are perfectly capable 
of deciding their religious beliefs for themselves. Anyone who 
does not share Palmer's beliefs is unlikely to be convinced by 
his two-minute prayers. Even if the prayers are unconstitution-
al, I would think it would be easier to ignore them than to bring 
this lawsuit. 3 But it appears that Chambers is offended by the 
prayers, and believes very strongly that he should not be sub-
jected to them in the legislative chamber. 
I find it harder to apologize for the State's actions. 
Even if the Nebraska Legislature were entitled to begin each sit-
ting with a prayer, why does it insist on asserting this right 
3Perhaps this is merely an indication of my non-litigious 
nature. I probably would not think it worth the effort of bring-
ing a lawsuit if the Nebraska Legislature began each day with two 
minutes of pornographic films. 
! 
.. 
when it knows that at least one4 of its members is deeply of-
fended by the practice? It strikes me as a matter of common 
courtesy, entirely independent of constitutional law, that those 1 
senators who wish to pray together should do so at a time and 
place that will not offend Chambers. I cannot believe that the 
purported secular purpose is the real reason for defending this 
lawsuit, let alone for petitioning this Court for cert. If all 
the Legislature wanted were "a brief, solemn and thoughtful act 
in a traditional manner" to bring the assembly to order, Petrs' 
Brief 27, it easily could provide for a secular ceremony, such as 
reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance." I am convinced that petrs' 
motives in this suit are closely related to their belief that 
prayer and religion are good things that should form a part of 
all of our activities. While I am sure that these beliefs are 
just as firmly and genuinely held as Chambers's beliefs, they are 
also clearly religious. It is ironic, but the best proof that 
petrs have a weak defense is their vigorous action in defending 
the suit. 
As the heading suggests, I write this section for two 
reasons. Birst, I do not think this case is important enough to 
be worth the Court's time. Given the vocal complaints about the 
Court's docket from some of the Justices who voted to grant, I 
think a DIG would be the best course. But you voted to deny, so 
.............. '- ~---
my complaints are directed to the wrong quarter. Second, you 
4There is some suggestion that a Jewish senator also has ob-
jected to Palmer's prayers. 
should know that I do not strongly about this case one way 
or the other. Although I think both sides 
are being pretty silly. Reversal would be inconsistent with the 
prior cases, but it would be an inconsistency that the Court 
could tolerate. 
B. The Historical Argument 
As in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, No. 81-1350, 
the Government argues that questionable official actions are con-
sistent with the Bill of Rights because the First Congress ac-
cepted them. We agreed in Villamonte-Marquez that the First Con-
gress's practice was strong evidence, but it could not be dispos-
itive. The same Congress, after all, explicitly authorized pun- -.-
-- I~ violate the Eighth Amendment, and the £z4- ' ishments that today would 
same Congress 
'----------------------~ 
Even the statute at issue in ~ 
Villamonte-Marquez, while constitutional in its application to -
ocean-going vessels near the coast, is probably inconsistent wit~ 
the Fourth Amendment to the extent it purports to authorize 
suspicionless searches of pleasure boats on inland rivers. Fur-
thermore, the type of analysis urged by the Government was re-
jected by the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
489 (1954). The Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment 
had specifically provided for segregated schools in the District 
of Columbia. 
The Establishment Clause in general, and legislative 
prayer in particular, is an area where very little weight can be 
placed on the eighteenth-century historical practice. On the 
', 
general point, eighteenth-century society was very different from 
7 
today' s society. Virtually everyone then was a Christian, ' and 
most were Protestants. So long as a legislative chaplain did not 
espouse views of one sect that were inconsistent with views of 
another sect, there was no minority whose rights were being 
abridged by the majority. Today's society is much more pluralis- r-~ 
tic. There are significant numbers of atheists, agnostics, and 
members of non-Christian religions. It is probably impossible to 
have a chaplain who could deliver prayers, as we generally under-
stand the term, that are not inconsistent with the views of at 
least the atheists and agnostics. Thus the overwhelming changes 
in social conditions make the eighteenth-century practice of lit-
tle direct relevance in this area. 
On the specific~ighteenth-century beliefs are 
again not very helpful. imself, who drafted the First 
Amendment, believed that legislative chaplaincies were inconsis-
tent with the Establishment Clause. In his "Detached Memoranda," 
~ 
he described the practice as "a palpable violation of equal 
rights, as well as of Constitutional principles." 5 One cannot f 
say that there was a clear recognition by the relevant Framers 
that the First Amendment would allow legislative chaplains, even 
in the eighteenth century. 
5Thi s document is reprinted as an appendix to the amicus 
brief of Murray, et al. This brief also discusses the historical 
arguments in some detail at pp. 5-16. If you find these argu-
ments significant, you should certainly read it. 
C. The Purpose-Effect-Entanglement Test 
Over the years, the Court has developed a "well-defined 
three-part test," Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 77'?. (1973), to judge laws under 
the Establishment Clause. As you explained in Nyquist: 
[T]o pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law 
in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular leg-
islative purpose, second, must have a primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and, 
third, must avoid excessive government entanglement 
with religion. 
Id., at 773 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). The Lemon Court also 
identified "the three main evils against which the Establishment 
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.'" Id., at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
u.s. 664' 668 (1970)). 
The first step is to identify the practices that must be 
judged against these criteria. I agree with CAB that it is nee-
essary to examine the Nebraska scheme as a whole. Although the 
compensation is a factor weighing against the system, it makes V(7 
little sense for this Court to say that everything except the 
compensation can continue. In any event, the DC's rationale for 
excluding the prayers themselves from the scope of the Establish-
ment Clause is specious. The DC reasoned that the Legislature 
was not making a law in having the prayers, for the prayers did 
not affect anyone outside the Legislature. But Rule 1, §§2, 21, 
and Rule 7 (A) , § 1 (b), are clearly legislative enactments that 
/} .. ~ ~~- t 
tv'- I • 
require compliance. Even if they did not ffect an~ outside 
of the Legislature (a questionable assum tion, in view of their 
symbolic effect), they affect Chambers -and he strenuously ob-
jects to them. 6 The Pirst Amendment designed to protect mi-
norities from the improper power of majority. In treating 
of a group of individuals, the DC misses his fundamental princi-
ple. M~~ 
Looking at the my 
tion of equal rights, as well as of 
Chambers sincerely believes, as a religious matter, Palmer's 
prayers are wrong. The Pirst Amendment prohibits the 
forcing the majority's inconsistent religious views upon him. By<)~ 
making the prayers an integral part of the legislative proces~
and by holding them at a key time in the da , the State is pre-
senting Chambers with an impermissible choice: stay in the cham-
ber and be subjected to religious statements by a state officer, 
or leave the chamber and be a less effective representative. It 
does not matter that Chambers is a member of a small minority, or 
that the majority not only tolerate but applaud the prayers. It 
is minorities such as this that the Pirst Amendment was designed 
6 under the DC' s reasoning, the population as a whole could 
decree by referendum that no Republican newspapers may be pub-
lished. The DC's rationale would say that this is not subject to 
the Pirst Amendment because it is not a law, and it is not a law 
because it does not affect anyone other than the body who passed 
it by a majority vote. 
to protect. The majority are free, of course, to meet together 
and pray, but they must do so at a time that does not burden 
Chamber's First Amendment rights. 
In my view, the State's prayer practices violate all 
three prongs of the purpose-effect-entanglement test and suffer 
from all of the evils identified in Lemon. Holding prayers is 
inherently religious. Palmer's prayers in particular are indis-
putably religious. The State's purported secular purpose could 
be achieved just as easily by reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance" 
or hearing a lay person's two-minute philosophical talk that made 
no meaningful reference to God. The effect of the Nebraska poli-
cy is also religious. The passions that this case inflames are 
clearly religious on both sides. The vocal opponents of state-
sponsored prayers do not object to "brief, solemn and thoughtful 
act [ s] "; they object to the religious aspects of the prayers. 
And the vocal supporters of state-sponsored prayers are motivated 
by their sincere religious beliefs. They are convinced that be-
lief in God and support of religious activities are among the 
pillars of America's greatness, 7 and that we should all conduct 
ourselves accordingly. Finally, a long-term relationship between 
the Legislature and a paid clergyman has the effect of entangling 
\\ 
the government in religion. Every day a ~~ eligious ceremony is an 
inherent part of the legislative program. 
7These views are probably right, but respect for dissenting 
minorities is another pillar of America's greatness. Thus the 
First Amendment prohibits the religious majority from imposing 
its views on people like Chambers. 
.  
In sum, I find it very difficult to reconcile a legisla-
tive chaplain with the Establishment Clause in today's pluralis-
tic society. If Palmer could compose "prayers" in such a way 
that they do not express meaningfulS religious views inconsistent 
with Chambers's, there would be no problem. But that would have 
the effect of making Palmer something other than a chaplain, and 
his daily speeches something other than "prayers." 
D. The Procedural Posture of the Case 
I can understand why the Court would prefer, on politi-
cal grounds, to avoid ruling on legislative prayer as a general 
matter. A vocal portion of the population would like to impose 
its religious views on the country as a whole, and this group is 
well represented in the other two branches of the government. 
Fortunately the present case does not require such a broad rul-
ing. CAS held that legislative prayers are not per se violations 
of the Establishment Clause, but that Nebraska had gone too far 
in its practices here. CAS's judgment left Nebraska free to for-
mulate some other plan that would continue to incorporate prayer 
7 
I 
8r do not think that a reference to God necessarily leads to "6t--
an Establishment Clause violation. Many references have become 
so commonplace that they have lost any real religious meaning. 
If Nebraska were to adopt my suggestion, for example, and recite 
the "Pledge of Allegiance" each morning, it would not violate the 
Establishment Clause to include the phrase "under God" that is 
part of the pledge. Similarly, I see no problem with this 
Court's Marshal declaring "God save the United States and this 
honorable Court" at the beginning of each session. The phrase 
"In God we trust" on our money is in the same category. The 
problem in Nebraska is that Palmer's prayers are designed to be 
meaningful, religious statements. 
into its legislative program. Chambers did not cross-petn for 
review of that judgment. The Court could thus affirm the judg-
ment without expressing a view on legislative prayer as a general 
matter, but concluding that there was an Establishment Clause 
violation on the facts of this case. 
III. Conclusion 
The decision below should be affirmed. Prayer is an 
inherently religious activity, and the prayers here were clearly 
religious. When a State conducts meaningful prayers as part of 
its official governmental functions, it violates the Establish-
ment Clause. The Court may wish to hold, however, merely that 
Nebraska violated the Establishment Clause on the extreme facts 
of this case. 
~ '· ,; 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-23 
FRANK MARSH, STATE TREASURER, ET AL., 
PETITIONER v. ERNEST CHAMBERS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The question presented is whether the Nebraska Legisla-
ture's practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer 
by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
I 
The Nebraska Legislature begins each of its sessions with 
a prayer offered by a chaplain who is chosen biennially by the 
Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid out of 
public funds. 1 Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister, 
has served as chaplain since 1965 at a salary of $319.75 per 
inonth for each month the legislature is in session. 
Ernest Chambers is a member of the Nebraska Legislature 
and a taxpayer of Nebraska. Claiming that the Nebraska 
Legislature's chaplaincy practice violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, he brought this action under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the prac-
1 Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral, Rules 1, 2, and 21. These prayers 
are recorded in the Legislative Journal and, upon the vote of the Legisla-
ture, collected from time to time into prayerbooks, which are published at 
the public expense. In 1975, 200 copies were printed, in 1978 (200 copies), 
and 1979 (100 copies). In total, publication costs amounted to $458.56. 
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tice. 2 After denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of 
legislative immunity, the District Court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause was not breached by the prayers, but was 
violated by paying the chaplain from public funds. It there-
fore enjoined the the Legislature from using public funds to 
pay the chaplain, but declined to enjoin the policy of begin-
ning sessions with prayers. Cross-appeals were taken. 3 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected argu-
ments that the case should be dismissed on Tenth Amend-
ment, legislative immunity, standing or federalism grounds. 
On the merits of the chaplaincy issue, the court refused to 
treat respondent's challenges as separable issues in the man-
ner of the District Court. Instead, the Court of Appeals as-
sessed the practice as a whole because "[p]arsing out [the] 
elements" would lead to "an incongruous result." 675 F. 2d 
228, 233 (CA8 1982). Applying the three-part test of Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), as set out in 
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 773 (1973), the court held that the chaplaincy 
practice violated all three elements of the test: the purpose 
and primary effect of selecting the same minister for 16 years 
and publishing his prayers was to promote a particular reli-
gious expression; use of state money for compensation and 
publication led to entanglement. 675 F. 2d, at 234-235. Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals modified the District Court's 
injunction and prohibited the State from engaging in any as-
pect of its established chaplaincy practice. 
We granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the prac-
2 Respondent named as defendants State Treasurer Frank Marsh, 
Chaplain Palmer, and the members of the Executive Board of the Legisla-
tive Council in their official capacity. All appear as petitioners before us. 
3 The District Court also enjoined the State from using public funds to 
publish the prayers holding that this practice violated the Establishment 
Clause. Petitioners have represented to us that they did not challenge 
this facet of the District Court's decision, Tr. of Oral Arg. 1!~20. Accord-
ingly, no issue as to publishing these prayers is before us. 
.· 
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tice of opening sessions with prayers by a State-employed 
clergyman,-- U.S.-- (1982), and we reverse. 4 
II 
The opening of sessions of legislative and other delib-
erative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the 
history of this country. From colonial times through the 
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legis-
lative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablish-
ment and religious freedom. In the very courtrooms in 
which the District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard 
and decided this case, the proceedings opened with a court 
attendant's announcement that concluded, "God save the 
United States and this Honorable Court." 
The tradition in many of the colonies was, of course, linked 
to an established church, 5 but the Continental Congress 
• Petitioners also sought review of their Tenth Amendment, federalism 
and immunity claims. They did not, however, challenge the Court of Ap-
peals' decision as to standing and we agree that Chambers, as a member of 
the Legislature and as a taxpayer whose taxes are used to fund the chap-
laincy, has standing to assert this claim. 
5 The practice in colonies with established churches is, of course, not dis-
positive of the legislative prayer question. The history of Virginia is in-
structive, however, because that colony took the lead in defining religious 
rights. In 1776, the Virginia Convention adopted a Declaration of Rights 
that included, as Article 16, a guarantee of religious liberty that is consid-
ered the precursor of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, A Documentary History 231-236 (1971); 
S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America, 491-492 (1970) (herein-
after Cobb). Virginia was also among the first to disestablish its church. 
Both before and after disestablishment, however, Virginia followed the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer. See e. g., J. of the 
House of Burgesses 34 (Nov. 20, 1712); Debates in the Convention of the 
Commonwealth of Va. 4 70 (June 2, 1788) (ratification convention); J. of the 
House of Delegates of Va. 3 (June 24, 1788) (state legislature). 
Rhode Island's experience mirrored that of Virginia. That colony was 
founded by Roger Williams, who was among the first of his era to espouse 
the principle of religious freedom. Cobb, at 426. As early as 1641, its 
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adopted the traditional procedure of opening its sessions with 
a prayer offered by a paid chaplain, see e. g., 1 J. of the Con-
tinental Cong. 26 (1774); 2 J. of the Continental Cong. 12 
(1775); 5 J. of the Continental Cong. 530 (1776); 6 J. of the 
Continental Cong. 887 (1776); 27 J. of the Continental Cong. 
683 (1784). See also 1 A. Stokes, Church and State in the 
United States 448-450 (1950) (hereinafter Stokes). Al-
though invocations were not offered during the Constitu-
tional Convention, 6 the First Congress, as one of its early 
items of business, also adopted the policy of selectfng a chap-
lain to open each session with prayer. Thus, on April 7, 
1789, the Senate appointed a committee "to take under con-
sideration the manner of electing Chaplains." J. of the Sen. 
10. On April 9, 1789, a similar committee was appointed by 
the House of Representatives. On April 25, 1789, the Sen-
ate elected its first chaplain, J. of the Sen. 16; the House fol-
lowed suit on May 1, 1789, J. of the H. R. 26. A statute pro-
viding for the payment of these chaplains was enacted into 
law on Sept. 22, 1789. 2 Annals of Cong. 2180; 1 Stat. 71. 7 
Legislature provided for liberty of conscience. Id., at 430. Yet theses-
sions of its ratification convention, like Virginia's, began with prayers, 
see W. Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, 1765-1790 668 
(1971) (reprinting May 26, 1790 minutes of the convention). 
• History suggests that this may simply have been an oversight. At 
one point, Benjamin Franklin suggested "that henceforth prayers implor-
ing the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held 
in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business." 1 M. 
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 452 (1911). His pro-
posal was rejected not because the Convention was opposed to prayer, but 
because it was thought that a mid-stream adoption of the policy would 
highlight prior omissions and because "(t]he Convention had no funds." 
Ibid.; see also Stokes, at 455-456. 
'It bears note that James Madison, one of the principal advocates of 
religious freedom in the colonies and a drafter of the Establishment Clause, 
see, e. g., Cobb, supra, at 495-497; Stokes, supra, at 537-552, was one of 
those appointed to undertake this task by the House of Representatives, J. 
of the H. R. 11-12; Stokes, at 541-549, and voted for the bill authorizing 
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It is significant that on Sept. 25, 1789, three days after 
Congress authorized the appointment of a paid chaplain, final 
agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights, 
J. of the Sen. 88; J. of the H. R. 121.8 The practice of open-
ing sessions with prayer has continued without interruption 
ever since that early session of Congress. 9 The practice has 
also been followed consistently in a great many states, 10 in-
payment of the chaplains, 1 Annals of Cong. 891. 
8 Interestingly, Sept. 25, 1789 was also the day that the House resolved 
to request the President to set aside a Thanksgiving Day to acknowledge 
"the many signal favors of Almighty God," J. of the H. R. 123. See also J. 
of the Sen. 88. 
9 The chaplaincy was challenged in the 1850's by "sundry petitions pray-
ing Congress to abolish the office of chaplain," S. Rep. No. 376, 32d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1 (1853). After consideration by the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Senate decided that the practice did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, reasoning that a rule permitting Congress to elect chap-
lains is not a law establishing a national church and that the chaplaincy was 
no different from Sunday Closing Laws, which the Senate thou h le ~ t: 
constitutional. In addition, the Senate reasoned since prayer was said by 
the very Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers 
could not have intended the First Amendment to forbid legislative prayer 
or viewed prayer as a step toward an established church. !d., at~. In 
any event, the 35th Congress abandoned the practice of electing chaplains 
in favor of inviting local clergy to officiate, see Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 
1st Sess. 14, 27-28 (1857). Elected chaplains were reinstituted by the 
36th Congress, Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1859); id., at 1016 
(1860). 
10 See Brief of the N at'l Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Cu-
riae. Although most state legislatures begin their sessions with prayer, 
most do not have a formal rule requiring this procedure. But see, e. g., 
Alaska State Leg. Uniform Rule 11 and 17 (19??) (providing for opening 
invocation); Ark. Rules of Sen 18 (1983); Colo. Legislator's Handbook, 
House of Rep. Rule 44 (1982); Idaho Rules of the H. R. and Joint Rules 2 
and 4 (1982); Ind. H. R. Rule 10 (1983); Idaho, Standing Rules and Order 
for the Gov't of the Sen Rule 4(a); Kan., Rules of the Sen. 4 (1983); Kan., 
Rules of the H. R. 103 (1983); Ky. Gen'l Ass. H. Res. 2 (1982); La. Rules of 
Order, Sen. Rule 10.1 (1983); La. Rules of Order, House Rule 8.1 (1982); 
Me. Sen. and House Register, Rules of the House 4 (1983); Md., Sen. and 
House of Delegates Rules 1 (19??); N. H. Manual for the Use of the Gen'l 
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eluding Nebraska, where the institution of opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer was adopted even before the State 
attained statehood, Nebraska Journal of the Council at the 
First Regular Session of the General Assembly 16 (Jan. 22, 
1855). do nud-~ 
Historical patterns alone, of courseJafford -B\) basi ~ Cf 
temporary violations of constitutionar limits, bi:irtllere is far -..... ~ 
more here than simply a pattern of over two centuries. The f 
intent of the draftsmen and of the First Congress is far 
weightier evidence of the accepted meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause than the views of those who came thereafter. 
In Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970), we con-
sidered the weight to be accorded to history: 
"It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested 
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long 
use, even when that span of time covers our entire na-
tional existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbro-
ken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast 
aside." 
No more is Nebraska's practice of more than a century, con-
sistent with Congressional practice, to be cast aside. It 
cannot be that in the same week that Members of Congress 
voted to appoint~d to pay a Chaplain for each House and also 
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for sub-
Court of N. H., Rules of the House 52 (a) (1981); N. D. Sen. and House 
Rules 101 and 310 (19??); Ore. Rules of Sen 4.01 (1983); Ore. Rules of H. R. 
401 (1983) (opening session only); Pa. H. R. Rule 17 (19??); Pa. Sen. Rule 
XI (1) (19??); S. D. Official Directory and Rules of theSen. and H. R. Joint 
Rules of the Sen. and House 4-1 (1983); Tenn. Permanent Rules of Order of 
the Sen. 6 (1981-1982) (provides for admission into Sen. chamber of the 
"Chaplain of the Day''); Tex. Rules of the H. R. 6 (1983); Utah Rules of the 
State Sen. and H. R. 4.04 (1983); Va. Manual ofthe Sen. and House of Del-
egates, Rules of the Sen. 21(a) (1982) (session opens with "period of devo-
tions"); Wash. Permanent Rules of the H. R. 15 (1983); Wyo. Rules of the 
Sen. 4-1 (1983); Wyo. Rules of the H. R. 2-1 (1983). See also, Mason's 
Manual of Legislative Procedure § 586(2) (1979). 
" 
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mission to the States, that they meant one Clause of that 
Amendment to forbid that which they had just declared ac-
ceptable. In applying the First Amendment to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), it would be incongruous to inter-
pret its provisions as imposing more stringent First Amend-
ment limits on the States than the draftsmen imposed on the 
Federal Government. It is this unique history which led the 
District Judge in this case to hold that the entanglement test 
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, surpra, was not violated by legisla-
tive prayer. 
RespondenU argu~that we should not rely too heavily on 
"the advice of the Founding Fathers," Abington School Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 237 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concur-
ring), because the messages of history often tend to be 
ambiguous and not relevant to a society far more heteroge-
neous than that of the Framers, id., at 240. On this score, 
respondent points out that John Jay and John Rutledge op-
posed the motion to begin the first session of the Continental 
Congress with prayer. Brief for Respondent 60. 11 We do 
not agree that evidence of opposition to a measure weakens 
the historical argument; indeed it strengthens it by demon-
strating that the subject was considered carefully and the ac-
tion not taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and 
without regard to the problems posed by a pluralistic society. 
Jay and Rutledge specifically grounded their objection on the 
fact that the delegates "were so divided in religious senti-
ments . . . that [they] could not join in the same act of 
worship." Their objection was overcome by Samuel Adams, 
11 It also could be noted that objections to prayer were raised, appar-
ently successfully, in Pennsylvania while ratification of the Constitution 
was debated, Penn. Herald, Nov. 24, 1787, and that in the 1820s, Madison 
expressed doubts concerning the chaplaincy practice. See, L. Pfeffer, 
Church State and Freedom 248-249 (rev. ed. 1967), quoting E. Fleet, Mad-
ison's "Detached Memoranda," III William and Mary Quarterly 558-559 
(1946). 
82-2~0PINION 
8 MARSH v. CHAMBERS 
who stated that "he was no bigot, and could hear a prayer 
from a gentleman of piety and virtue, who was at the same 
time a friend to his country." C. Adams, Familiar Letters of 
John Adams and his Wife, Abigail Adams, during the Revo-
lution 37-38, reprinted in Stokes, at 449. This interchange 
emphasizes that the early legislators did not consider opening 
prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing 
the government's "official seal of approval on one religious 
view" cf. 675 F. 2d, at 234. Rather, the Founding Fathers 
looked at invocations merely as "conduct whose . . . effect 
... harmonize[d] with the tenets of some or all religions." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). 
The Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from 
regulating conduct simply because it "harmonizes with reli-
gious canons." !d., at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
And this is especially true where, as here, the individual 
claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not 
readily susceptible to "religious indoctrination," see Tilton 
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 686 (1971); Colo v. Treasurer 
& Receiver Gen'l, 392 N. E. 2d 1195, 1200 (Mass. 1979), or 
peer pressure, compare, Abington, supra, 374 U. S., at 290 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken histo of more 
than 200 years, there can e no ou a t e practice of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer has, like the Sunday 
Closing Laws upheld in McGowan, become part of the fabric 
of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body 
entrusted with making the laws is not an "establishment" of 
religion, but a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held in this country. As Justice Douglas observed, "[ w ]e are 
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952). 
III 
We turn then to the question of whether any features of 
the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause. 
82-23--0PINION 
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Beyond the bare fact that a prayer is offered, three points 
have been made: first, that a clergyman of only one denomi-
nation-Presbyterian-has been selected for 16 years; 12 sec-
ond, that the chaplain is paid at public expense; and third, 
that the prayers are in the J udeo-Christian tradition. 13 
Weighed against. the historical background, these factors do 
not serve to invalidate Nebraska's practice. 14 
The Court of Appeals was concerned that Palmer's long 
tenure has the effect of giving preference to his religious 
views. We, no more than Members of the Congresses of this 
century, can perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergy-
man of one denomination advances the beliefs of a particular 
church. 15 To the contrary, the evidence indicates that 
Palmer was reappointed because his performance and per-
sonal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him. 16 
12 In comparison, the First Congress provided for the appointment of 
two chaplains of different denominations who would alternate between the 
two chambers on a weekly basis, J. of the Sen. 12; J. of the H. R. 16. 
13 Palmer characterizes his prayers as "nonsectarian," "Judeo Christian," 
and with "elements of the American civil religion." App. 75 and 87. (De-
position of Robert E. Palmer). Although some of his earlier prayers were 
often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all references to Christ after a 
1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator. /d., at 49. 
"It is also claimed that Nebraska's practice of collecting the prayers into 
books violates the First Amendment. Because the State did not appeal 
the District Court order enjoining further publications, see n. 3, supra, 
this issue is not before us and we express no opinion on it. 
" We note that Dr. Edward L. R. Elson, served as Chaplain of the Sen-
ate of the United States from January 1969 to February 1981, a period of 
12 years; Dr. Frederick Brown Harris served from February 1949 to Janu-
ary 1969, a period of 20 years. Senate Library, Chaplains of the Federal 
Government (rev. 1982). 
•• Nebraska's practice is consistent with the manner in which the First 
Congress viewed its chaplains. Reports contemporaneous with the elec-
tions reported only the chaplains' names, and not their religions or church 
affiliations, see, e. g., II Gazette of the U. S. 18 (April25, 1789); V Gazette 
of the U. S. 18 (April27, 1789) (listing nominees for chaplain of the House); 
VI Gazette of the U.S. 23 (May 1, 1789). See also S. Rep. 376, supra, at 
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Palmer was not the only clergyman heard by the Legislature; 
several guest chaplains have officiated at the request of vari-
ous legislators and as substitutes during Palmer's absences. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Absent proof that the chaplain's reap-
pointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, we con-
clude that his long tenure does not in itself violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
Nor is the compensation of the chaplain from public funds a 
reason to invalidate the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy; 
remuneration is grounded in historic practice initiated, as we 
noted earlier, ante, at --, by the same Congress that 
adopted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
The Continental Congress paid its chaplain, see e. g., 6 J. of 
the Continental Cong. 887 (1776), as did some of the states, 
see e. g., Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of 
Va. 470 (June 26, 1788). Currently, many state legislatures 
and the United States Congress provide for the compensation 
of their chaplains, Brief for Nat'l Conference of State Legis-
latures as Amicus Curiae 3; 2 U. S. C. §§ 61d and 84-2; 
H. R. Res. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 17 Nebraska has 
paid its chaplain for well over a century, see 1867 Neb. Laws 
§§ 2-4 (June 21, 1867), reprinted in, Neb. Gen'l Stat. 459 
(1873). The content of the Nebraska prayers is not, and can-
3. 
11 The states' practices differ widely. Like Nebraska, several states 
choose a chaplain who serves for the entire legislative session. In other 
states, the prayer is offered by a different clergyman each day. Under 
either system, some states pay their chaplains and others do not. For 
states providing for compensation statutorily or by resolution, see, e. g., 
Cal. Gov't Code Ann.§§ 9170, 9171, 9320 and Sen. Res. No.6 (1983); Colo. 
House J., 54th Gen. Ass. 17-19 (Jan. 5, 1983); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-9 
(1982); Geo. H. R. Res. No. 3(1)(e) (1983); Geo. S. Res. No. 3(1)(r)(1983); 
Iowa Code § 2.11 (1983); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 21.150 (1969) (West); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 218.200 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:11-2 (1970) (West); N. M. Stat. 
Ann. Const. Art. IV § 9 (1978); Okla. Stat. Tit. 74, §§ 291.12 and 292.1 
(West Supp. 1982); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, § 19 (1982 Supp.); Wise. Stat. 
§ 13.125 (1982 Supp.). 
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not be, of concern to us. iThe sincerity of those who, like re-
spondent, entertain concerns such as those raised here can-
not be doubted; the concern is that if prayer in this context is 
permitted, it can be the beginning of the establishment the 
Founding Fathers feared. But Justice Goldberg, concurring 
in Abington, 374 U. S., at 308, aptly disposed of this fear: 
"It is of course true that great consequences can grow 
from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional 
adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish 
between real threat and mere shadow." 
The unbroken practice in the National Congress and N e-
braska gives abundant assurance that there is no "real 
threat" here, at least not "while this Court sits," Panhandle 
Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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more here than simply a pattern of oveL two 
centuries." 
The opinion then proceeds to emphasize the rele-
vant history, and on p. 8 it says: 
"In light of the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more tban 200 year~, there can be 
nn ~oubt that the practice of openinq legis-
lative sessions with prayer has, like the 
~unday ~losing Law9 upheld in ~c~owan, become 
part of the fabric of our society." 
I would not suggest that "historical patterns 
alone" afford no basis for Eejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge. This depends, as in this case, on ho~~ consistently 
the "patterns" have been pra~ticed, and on other relevant 
factors. 
My guess also is that you may receiv~ som~ adverse 
reaction to equating this case with Sunday Closinq Laws, as 
- perhapA unhappily - there have been dramatic changes in 
the mores and habits of people even since McGowan. I am not 
at all sure that there wou1d be five votes today to sustain 




'~ join is not condLtion~d upon your making the 
1 me~~ly bring th~se ~uggestions to your atten-
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:%UJtrtntt <!fourt of tlrt ~b .;§tahs 
'masqi:ngtott. ~. <!f. 21JgtJ!.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 28, 1983 
Re: No. 82-23-Marsh v. Chambers 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
,®uputttt ~(llttf cf tip~ ~n:it.tlt .*tatctl 
.. ettlfrittgtM. ~. ~· 20giJ!..;J 
Re: No. 82-23 - Marsh v. Chambers 
Dear Chief: 
June 3, 1983 





The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.:§np-r tw <!Jettri cf tq t ~ni:tt lt ~ hdt.« 
1ll rur ltbtgt on, ~. Qf. 2Il.? '!-~ 
June 3, 1983 
No. 82-23 Marsh v. Chambers 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 




82-23 Marsh v. Chambers (Mike) 
CJ for the Court 
1st draft 5/26/83 
3rd draft 6/3/83 
4th draft 6/29/83 
Joined by BRW, HAB, LFP, WHR, SOC 
JPS dissent 
1st draft 6/8/83 
WJB dissent 
Typed draft 6/28/83 
1st draft 6/29/83 
Joined by TM 
